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Abstract 
 
We investigate how competitive behavior affects the capital structure of a firm. Theory 
predicts that the impact of different types of output market uncertainty (in particular, 
unanticipated shocks in demand and costs) on a firm’s leverage depends on the type of 
competition in an industry. We test these predictions in a sample of U.S. manufacturing 
firms by classifying firms into Cournot competition (strategic substitutes), and Bertrand 
competition (strategic complements). We show that demand uncertainty is positively 
related to leverage for firms in both the Cournot and the Bertrand sample. Cost uncertainty 
has a significantly positive impact on the leverage of Cournot firms, but plays a negligible 
role for Bertrand firms. Our results support the strategic use of debt and highlight the role 
of firms’ competitive behavior in the product market in their capital structure decisions.  
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1. Introduction 
Financing and output decisions are closely linked. Several theoretical studies (e.g., Brander 
and Lewis, 1986; Maksimovic, 1988; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Showalter, 1995; 
Dasgupta and Titman, 1998; Faure-Grimaud, 2000; Wanzenried, 2003) emphasize the 
strategic role of debt in a firm’s competitive strategy in the output market. An important 
feature of these theoretical models is that the strategic role of debt depends on the firm’s 
competitive environment. In particular, the link between a firm’s capital structure and its 
output market decisions is different in Cournot and Bertrand competition.  
Brander and Lewis (1986) introduce a Cournot competition model to link the choice 
of debt level and output decisions. Because of limited liability, the equity holders of a firm 
that take on debt optimize their output strategy over non-bankruptcy states of the world. 
When the firm faces uncertainty in the output market (e.g., uncertainty about future demand 
or costs), equity holders ignore the bad states of demand or costs in which debt holders 
would suffer. Therefore, they have an incentive to gain a strategic advantage in the output 
market by competing more aggressively. In short, Brander and Lewis (1986) predict that 
Cournot firms subject to demand and/or cost uncertainty have an incentive to commit to a 
large output by using a highly leveraged capital structure. In a model of Bertrand 
competition, Showalter (1995) shows that different sources of output market uncertainty 
have a different effect on a firm’s capital structure. When demand is uncertain, debt carries 
a strategic advantage. However, when costs are uncertain, Bertrand firms have an incentive 
to reduce their debt level. 
The models of Brander and Lewis (1986) and Showalter (1995) thus produce 
testable hypotheses that depend on the type of competition. In Cournot competition, higher 
demand uncertainty leads to higher debt levels, and cost uncertainty also encourages firms 
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to have a high leverage. In Bertrand competition, higher demand uncertainty induces higher 
debt, while higher cost uncertainty induces firms to choose lower debt levels.  
Empirical research on the link between debt and product market competition is 
scarce. Chevalier (1995a, 1995b), Phillips (1995), and Kovenock and Phillips (1997) focus 
on a small number of industries in which some firms experience sharp changes in their 
capital structure. Lyandres (2006) presents a model that describes how the extent of 
competitive interaction among firms influences the role of strategic debt. He tests the 
predictions of the model on a large sample of U.S. manufacturing companies.  
To our knowledge, Showalter (1999) is the only study that conducts an empirical 
test of the effect of demand and cost uncertainty on capital structure choice. Showalter 
shows that U.S. manufacturing firms increase debt as demand uncertainty becomes more 
important, but reduce debt as costs become more uncertain. He concludes that his findings 
are consistent with the predictions of models on Bertrand competition, and thus with the 
hypothesis that the firms in his sample engage in Bertrand competition.  
 Despite the clear distinction that theoretical models make between Cournot and 
Bertrand competition, empirical studies to date do not attempt to take the type of 
competitive behavior into account. The aim of our study is to test the theoretical predictions 
of Brander and Lewis (1986) and Showalter (1995) and explicitly investigate the different 
implications these models have for firms in Bertrand and Cournot competition. We use the 
competitive strategy measure of Sundaram, John and John (1996) to characterize the 
competitive behavior of firms in different industries. This approach allows us to identify 
industries in which the competitive environment can be categorized as either Cournot or 
Bertrand competition. For the samples of Cournot and Bertrand firms, we estimate a capital 
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structure model with conventional determinants of leverage and measures of cost and 
demand uncertainty as explanatory variables. 
For Cournot firms, we find that both demand uncertainty and cost uncertainty are 
significantly positively associated with leverage. The effects are statistically significant 
across several different measures of leverage and proxies of uncertainty. For Bertrand 
firms, demand uncertainty has a significantly positive impact on leverage, but cost 
uncertainty does not have a significant effect on capital structure. The impact of different 
sources of uncertainty clearly differs in our two samples of Cournot and Bertrand firms. 
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Brander and Lewis 
(1986) that higher demand and cost uncertainty induce Cournot firms to increase debt 
levels. Our evidence also supports the positive impact of demand uncertainty on Bertrand 
firms’ leverage, as predicted by Showalter (1995), but there is no evidence for the role of 
cost uncertainty among these firms. Our analysis underlines the role of strategic debt and 
shows that distinguishing firms according to their competitive behavior is important. 
Whether firms are competing in Cournot or Bertrand affects the way their capital structure 
choice is influenced by output market uncertainty. 
 
2. Literature 
In this section, we briefly review the theoretical and empirical literature on the relation 
between leverage and product market competition.  
Brander and Lewis (1986) analyze a two-stage Cournot model. In Cournot 
competition, firms compete by setting the quantities they produce. With locally linear 
demand curves, Cournot firms compete as strategic substitutes (Bulow, Geanakoplos and 
Klemperer, 1985). In the first stage of the model, firms decide on the amount of debt. In the 
 5 
second stage, they compete in the output market. In this framework, debt commits the 
equity holders of a firm to pursue a more aggressive product market strategy by raising the 
quantity to produce. Because of the limited liability effect, the equity holders of firms that 
take on debt optimize only over non-bankruptcy states of the world. If the firm goes 
bankrupt, the equity holders’ losses are limited by the value of their initially contributed 
investment, which is assumed to be zero in this model. Debt holders suffer in the case of a 
shortage of the firm’s returns. A higher dispersion in anticipated levels of either demand or 
costs increases the uncertainty that the firm faces. And higher uncertainty induces equity 
holders in Cournot firms to compete more aggressively by producing more. As a result, 
higher uncertainty, regardless of whether the source is demand or costs, leads to higher 
levels of both output and debt. Debt is always of strategic advantage when Cournot firms 
face demand or cost uncertainty. 
Showalter (1995) modifies Brander and Lewis’ (1986) model to the case of 
Bertrand competition in which rival firms compete by setting prices. With non-increasing 
marginal costs, Bertrand firms compete as strategic complements (Bulow et al., 1985). 
Showalter shows that in this type of competition, the source of output market uncertainty 
plays a crucial role in determining the optimal debt level. With Bertrand competition, debt 
brings about a strategic advantage only when demand is uncertain. When this type of 
uncertainty is large, high prices are encouraged through high debt levels. By increasing its 
debt, a firm optimizes over good states of the world (i.e., high demand states) and therefore 
chooses a higher equilibrium price. Rival firms react by raising their prices, thus increasing 
the expected profit of the leveraged firms. However, when costs are uncertain, firms that 
take on debt place emphasis on low cost states, and therefore choose a lower equilibrium 
price. The commitment to a lower price induces rival firms to decrease their price, reducing 
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the expected profit of the leveraged firm. As a result, Bertrand firms facing high cost 
uncertainty have no incentive to hold debt. Showalter (1999) argues that in a more general 
model where debt has other advantages, higher cost uncertainty induces Bertrand firms to 
reduce leverage below the optimal debt level that firms would hold in the absence of any 
strategic motive.  
Wanzenried (2003) shows that demand uncertainty (or volatility) also raises a firm’s 
optimal debt level in models of both Cournot and Bertrand competition in the presence of 
differentiated products. She does not take uncertainty on the cost side into account. Haan 
and Toolsema (2007) present a numerical analysis of strategic debt using Wanzenried’s 
(2003) two-stage differentiated goods model with a correction in solving the second stage 
of the model. In contrast to the result of Wanzenried, they find that the equilibrium debt 
level decreases for both Bertrand and Cournot firms as demand becomes more volatile.  
Showalter (1999) is the only empirical study we know that empirically investigates 
the role of demand and cost uncertainty in determining a firm’s capital structure. Showalter 
analyzes a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms over the period 1975-1994 and examines 
the relation between leverage and the demand/cost uncertainty that firms face in product 
markets. To measure demand and cost uncertainty, Showalter (1999) proposes an approach 
that uses trend regressions. Demand (cost) uncertainty is calculated as the natural logarithm 
of the standard error of regressions of sales (costs of good sold over sales) on linear and 
non-linear trends. His empirical results are in line with Showalter (1995). There is a 
positive relation between leverage and demand uncertainty and a negative relation between 
leverage and cost uncertainty. Showalter (1999) concludes that price competition is the 
prevalent competitive behavior in U.S. manufacturing.  
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The type of competitive behavior plays a crucial role in theoretical models of the 
link between competition and leverage. We are not aware of any studies that explicitly 
allow for the type of competition affecting this link. We contribute to the literature by 
directly testing the predictions of models of Cournot and Bertrand competition on the 
relation between output market uncertainty and capital structure. To that end, we classify 
firms in our empirical analysis into different types of strategic interaction in their industries. 
The hypotheses that we aim to test are as follows. Under Bertrand competition:  
(H1) firms use more debt when demand is more uncertain;  
(H2) firms use less debt when costs are more uncertain.  
Under Cournot competition:  
(H3) firms use more debt when demand is more uncertain;  
(H4) firms use more debt when costs are more uncertain.  
 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. Strategic competition measures: complements vs. substitutes 
Sundaram et al. (1996) argue that whether competition occurs in strategic substitutes (SS) 
or strategic complements (SC) depends on the effects of a firm’s moves on its competitor’s 
marginal profits. Suppose two duopolistic firms, A and B, are in an initial equilibrium, i.e., 
both firms have set marginal revenues equal to marginal costs. If firm A changes its 
strategy due to an exogenous shock, this change affects its own as well as firm B’s 
marginal profits. To reach a new equilibrium, both firms re-optimize based on the expected 
consequences for their marginal profits. If firm B re-optimizes by competing in SS, then its 
marginal profits must be decreasing. On the contrary, if firm B re-optimizes by competing 
in SC, then its marginal profits must be increasing. Thus, competition in SC and SS can be 
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distinguished by examining the sign of the second derivative of firm A’s profits with 
respect to its own and firm B’s strategic variable. 
Sundaram et al. (1996) provide an empirical measure of the type of competition by 
constructing a proxy for the second derivative in the context of R&D competition. Their 
competitive strategy measure (CSM) is the coefficient of correlation between f/Sf and 
Sc, where f/Sf is the change in a firm’s profit margin (which is the change in net 
income over the change in net sales), and Sc is the change in the competitors’ output.1 If 
CSM is smaller than zero, then competition is in SS; if CSM is greater than zero, then 
competition is in SC. In the empirical implementation, Sundaram et al. use cutoff points of 
-0.05 and +0.05 to define the sample of SS and SC firms. Lyandres (2006) provides a 
mathematical proof for the validity of this CSM measure as a proxy for the nature of 
product market competition, under the assumption that the firm’s value function remains 
constant in the short-run. In the long-run, an industry-wide shock might change a firm’s 
value function and introduce noise in the relation between the firm’s marginal profit and its 
rivals’ sales. Lyandres (2006) develops a model in which a firm’s leverage is positively 
related to the extent of competitive interaction within its industry. He uses the absolute 
value of CSM as a measure of the extent of interaction. 
We follow the approach of Sundaram et al. (1996) to measure the type of strategic 
competition. We argue that competitive behavior may change over time when firms face 
industry shocks or changes in demand functions. Therefore, we estimate CSM based on 
                                                 
1
 Sundaram et al. (1996) include all firms with the same 4-digit SIC except the firm in question in the set 
of competitors. 
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quarterly data during a relatively short period of time: we require 20 consecutive quarters of 
sales (Compustat data ITEM#2, quarterly database) and profits (ITEM#8).2  
We use a narrow definition of industries based on their 4-digit SIC. Therefore, we 
argue that it is reasonable to assume that competitive behavior is consistent across firms in 
each industry-year. We derive a measure representative for each industry-year’s 
competition type. After obtaining the CSM measures for each firm-year, we calculate the 
mean and the standard deviation of the CSM for each industry in each year. We use the 
following measures of competitive behavior: (i) SSDUM is a dummy that takes a value of 
one if the industry-year mean of CSM is significantly positive, and a value of zero 
otherwise; (ii) SCDUM takes a value of one if the industry-year mean of CSM is 
significantly negative, and a value of zero otherwise. We use a 10% significance level. This 
procedure is consistent with Lyandres (2006), although he does not take into account the 
statistical significance. Our approach results in the identification of three separate samples 
of firms: Cournot firms, Bertrand firms, and unidentified firms.3 
 
3.2. Measures of demand and cost uncertainty 
Following Showalter (1999), we define three demand uncertainty proxies (DEM1, DEM2, 
and DEM3) as the natural logarithm of the standard error of the following trend regressions: 
 tt etY ++= 10 ββ  (1) 
 tt uttY +++=
2
210 γγγ  (2) 
 tt vtttY ++++=
3
3
2
210 λλλλ  (3) 
                                                 
2
 Sundaram et al. (1996) use 40 quarters in the empirical estimation of CSM. Lyandres (2006) uses annual 
data for 10 years or more to estimate the extent of strategic interaction. 
3
 The unidentified firms have an industry-year CSM which is not significantly different from zero. The 
sample of unidentified firms is not further analyzed in our study. 
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where Yt is either sales or costs of goods sold divided by sales at time t. Showalter’s (1999) 
assumption behind this approach is that a firm’s sales and costs grow or decline in a fairly 
predictable pattern. Deviations from the anticipated trends represent unanticipated shocks 
to demand or costs. We scale the demand uncertainty proxies by sales to prevent larger 
firms from having a larger uncertainty measure by definition. Our three cost uncertainty 
proxies (COST1, COST2, and COST3) are taken from the same regressions, but with the 
costs of goods sold (ITEM#30) divided by sales in quarter t as dependent variable.  
Showalter (1999) assumes that demand and cost uncertainty are stable over a long 
period of time and he estimates the regressions over his whole sample period, from 1975 to 
1994. We argue that a firm’s demand or cost uncertainty may exhibit important changes 
over time. Therefore, we use quarterly data for five consecutive years in estimating demand 
and cost uncertainty. In addition, we control for predictable seasonal effects in the 
estimation by adding three quarter dummies to regressions (1), (2), and (3).  
 
3.3. Leverage measures  
To facilitate a comparison with Showalter’s (1999) study, we stay close to his choice of 
measures for capital structure and other variables. As CSM and the output market 
uncertainty measures are based on five consecutive years of data, we compute the average 
of a firm’s leverage and the firm-specific capital structure determinants over five 
consecutive years as well. We use four measures of leverage, two of which are based on 
book values and two on market values. The book value of the long-term debt ratio 
(LDEBTBV) is defined as the average of total long-term debt (Compustat data ITEM#9, 
annual database) over five consecutive years divided by the average of total assets (ITEM 
#6). The market value of the long-term debt ratio (LDEBTMV) is calculated as the average 
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of total long-term debt divided by the average market value of total assets.4 The book value 
of the total debt ratio (TDEBTBV) is average total debt (ITEM #9 + ITEM #34) divided by 
average total assets. The market value of the total debt ratio (TDEBTMV) is defined as 
average total debt divided by the average market value of total assets.  
 
3.4. Capital structure determinants 
Empirical capital structure research uses variables related to static trade-off, agency, and 
information asymmetry considerations to explain leverage. In the static trade-off 
framework, the firm is viewed as setting a target debt-to-assets ratio and moving towards it. 
A firm’s capital structure is determined by the trade-off between tax advantages and 
bankruptcy-related costs. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that the tax advantage of 
debt diminishes as other tax reductions, such as tax and investment tax credits, increase. 
Because these variables act as a tax shield substitute for debt, a negative relation between 
leverage and these non-debt tax shields is expected. The proxy for non-debt tax shields 
used in this study (NDTS) is defined as the ratio of average depreciation (ITEM#125) and 
investment tax credit (ITEM#208) to average total assets. With respect to bankruptcy costs, 
we use the following variables: asset tangibility (higher tangibility of assets indicates lower 
risk for the lender as well as reduced direct costs of bankruptcy), firm risk (higher risk 
indicates higher volatility of earnings and higher probability of bankruptcy), and firm size 
(an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy; larger firms are less likely to face 
financial distress). We measure tangibility (TANG) as the ratio of average net fixed assets 
(ITEM#8) to average total assets; firm risk (RISK) as the standard deviation of the ratio of 
                                                 
4
 The measure market value of total assets is calculated as (Total debt + Market value of equity + Preferred 
stock – Deferred taxes and investment credits) = ITEM #9 + ITEM #34 + (ITEM #199*ITEM #54) + ITEM 
#10 – ITEM #35. 
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operating income before depreciation (ITEM#13) to total assets; and firm size (SIZE) as the 
natural logarithm of average total assets. 
Agency conflicts between equity holders and debt holders arise from asset-
substitution and underinvestment. To minimize these conflicts, firms with high growth 
opportunities have a preference for a low leverage, thus seeking equity financing for their 
new projects instead of debt financing. Agency theory predicts that growth opportunities 
are negatively associated with leverage. We use the market-to-book ratio (MTB), defined as 
the average market value of total assets over the average book value of total assets, as a 
proxy for growth opportunities. If debt is not collateralized, equity holders have incentives 
to expropriate wealth from debt holders (Myers, 1977). Creditors may also demand a higher 
interest rate, forcing firms to choose equity instead. Our measure of tangibility can be used 
as a proxy for collateralization, which is expected to be positively related to leverage.  
The pecking-order theory suggests that firms follow a specific hierarchy in 
financing: they prefer internal over external financing. If external financing is required, a 
firm issues the safest security first. That is, it first issues debt, then hybrid securities such as 
convertible bonds, and equity only as the last resort. It is common to use profitability to test 
the pecking-order theory: more profitable firms are likely to have less leverage as they 
make use of the internally generated fund first. We measure profitability (PROFIT) as the 
average operating income before depreciation divided by the average total assets.  
From the asymmetric information viewpoint, bigger firms are likely to provide 
better information to the market and are expected to have better access to credit. Hence, 
firm size is expected to be positively correlated with debt levels. Liquidity is another 
variable that determines the capital structure choice of firms. The agency theory and 
pecking-order theory both predict a negative relation between liquidity and leverage. We 
 13 
measure liquidity (LIQUID) as the ratio of average cash and short-term investments 
(ITEM#1) to average total assets. In addition, we use 2-digit SIC industry dummies in our 
regression models to capture the unobservable influences of industry characteristics on 
leverage choice of firms with common product lines.5   
 
3.5. Data 
We obtain firm-level data from the COMPUSTAT North America database for the period 
1985 to 2004. We collect data at two different frequencies: annually and quarterly. At the 
annual frequency, we take all manufacturing firms’ relevant financial information such as 
total assets, tangible assets, profits, debt levels, etc. At the quarterly frequency, we collect 
sales, profits, and costs of goods sold, all of which are needed to estimate CSM and 
demand/cost uncertainty.  
We define competitors as all firms in the COMPUSTAT data base with the same 4-
digit SIC code (ITEM#324) in each particular year. Therefore, we drop the observations 
that do not have records of 4-digit historical SIC. As we focus on U.S. manufacturing firms 
only, we omit observations with historical SIC below 2000 or above 3999. We exclude 
firms in industries concerned with miscellaneous items.6 Competition within industries is 
the main focus of our study, so the identification of the relevant competitors within the 
same industry is essential. We require firms to have both total assets and sales greater than 
1 million USD. We discard firms without quarterly data for sales, profits, and costs of 
                                                 
5
 We conduct robustness checks by using alternative measures of leverage and capital structure 
determinants. For example, we also measure LDEBTBV as the average ratio of long-term debt to the book 
value of total assets (instead of the ratio of the of average long-term debt to the average book value of total 
assets), LDEBTMV as the average ratio of long-term debt to the market value of assets, TANG as the average 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets, PROFIT as the average ratio of operating income to total assets, etc. The 
results are similar.  
6
 We do not take these industries as the last 2 digits of the 4-digit SIC code ending with 99 as in MacKay 
and Phillips (2005), but check these industries manually to make sure of the correct definitions. This 
procedure is in line with Clarke (1989) and Campello (2006). 
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goods sold. We follow MacKay and Phillips (2005) and drop observations with negative 
sales or assets for either annual or quarterly records.  
The data screens yield a final sample of 126 industries, consisting of 14,007 firm-
years and 2,660 distinct firms. We analyze data in three consecutive five-year periods to 
avoid that we use overlapping data for calculating CSM, demand and cost uncertainty, and 
the other variables. We present results that are based on the periods 1989-1994, 1995-1999, 
and 2000-2004.7 After applying Sundaram et al.’s (1996) approach to measure strategic 
competition, we obtain a sample of Bertrand firms that includes 954 observations (the 
“Bertrand sample”), and a sample of Cournot firms that includes 633 observations (the 
“Cournot sample”). 
We estimate panel data models with firm random effects to investigate the relation 
between output market uncertainty and leverage.8 We use time dummies (for three different 
periods) and White standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. The basic regression 
model is as follows: 
++++++= 
=
itititit
i
iiit NDTSRISKSIZETANGINDUSTRYLEV 23222120
19
1
0 ββββββ  
 + itititititit COSTDEMLIQUIDMTBPROFIT εβββββ +++++ 2827262524  (4) 
where LEV is the proxy for leverage; INDUSTRYi are the industry dummies for 2-digit SIC 
industries; DEM and COST represent the demand and cost uncertainty proxies DEM1, 
DEM2, DEM3 and COST1, COST2, COST3, respectively. The other explanatory variables 
are described above. In a robustness check, we include a measure of competition intensity, 
                                                 
7
 Other combinations of 3 consecutive periods are used for robustness checks: (i) 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 
and 1997-2001; (ii) 1988-1992, 1993-1997, and 1998-2002; and (iii) 1989-1993, 1994-1998, and 1999-2003. 
We find similar results. 
8
 A Hausman test shows that the differences between the coefficients in the fixed and random effects panel 
models are not statistically significant. 
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the absolute value of industry-average CSM, as an additional explanatory variable as 
suggested by Lyandres (2006). 
 
4. Empirical analysis of the link between leverage and demand/cost uncertainty 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of firm characteristics in the Bertrand and Cournot 
samples. Many firm characteristics differ significantly across both samples. Generally, 
firms competing as strategic substitutes are smaller, less prone to business risk, and more 
profitable, and have smaller fixed assets, fewer growth opportunities, and less liquidity. 
Average demand and cost uncertainty are lower for firms in the Cournot sample compared 
to the Bertrand sample.  
Table 2 presents correlations between the variables in the Bertrand sample (Panel 
A) and the Cournot sample (Panel B). Similar to Showalter (1999), we observe that the 
highest correlations between the explanatory variables are those between PROFIT and 
DEM/COST in both samples. The relatively high and negative correlations between 
profitability and both sources of uncertainty indicate that firms that experience less cost and 
demand uncertainty on average have higher profits. A potential explanation is that under 
predictable output market conditions, firms are better able to anticipate optimal capacity 
and inventory levels. Liquidity has a large, positive correlation with both DEM and COST 
in the Bertrand sample, while in the Cournot sample only the correlation between LIQUID 
and COST is relatively high. This may be explained by the fact that firms facing high 
output market uncertainty have a greater need for liquid assets in order to be well prepared 
for poor states of the world. 
 In Table 3, we report the averages of the leverage and the demand and cost 
uncertainty measures for the industries included in the Bertrand and Cournot samples. The 
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Bertrand (Cournot) sample consists of 24 (21) 4-digit SIC industries. Within each sample, 
industries are presented in order of descending long-term debt ratios based on book values. 
The table also shows the rank order for each of the variables, with 1 as the highest value.  
Within the Bertrand sample, the industries with the highest average leverage ratios 
correspond to those characterized by low demand and cost uncertainty. The low leverage 
industries generally have relatively high demand and cost uncertainty. The industries that 
we classify as Bertrand and that have the highest debt levels include plastics (SIC 3081, 
3086), alcohol (SIC 2084), and fabrics (SIC 2211); the lowest average leverage is observed 
in the semiconductor service (SIC 3674), telegraph apparatus (SIC 3661), and biological 
diagnostics (SIC 2836) industries. 
Within the Cournot sample, we observe high average debt ratios in the paperboard 
(SIC 2631), aluminum (SIC 3334), steel works (SIC 3321), and insulating nonferrous wire 
(SIC 3357) industries; and low leverage in the electro-medical apparatus (SIC 3845), lab 
analytical instruments (SIC 3826), and magnetic optical recording (SIC 3695) industries. 
The industries competing in Cournot with the highest leverage appear to have medium or 
relatively high levels of uncertainty in both demand and costs. Clearly, the association 
between DEM/COST and leverage varies systematically across the two samples with 
different competitive behavior. 
 Table 4 reports the estimation results of our capital structure regressions. For each 
sample, and for each of the four measures of leverage, we estimate three panel models with 
three different proxies of demand and cost uncertainty as independent variables (in addition 
to the conventional determinants of capital structure used in previous studies). The results 
are consistent across different leverage proxies, but the statistical significance is somewhat 
stronger when market-value measures of leverage are used. 
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 The regressions based on the Bertrand sample (see Panel A) support hypothesis H1, 
which states that Bertrand firms facing higher demand uncertainty use more debt. The 
results show that demand uncertainty indeed has a positive impact on the debt ratio of 
Bertrand firms, consistent with the theoretical models of Showalter (1995) and Wanzenried 
(2003). The coefficient of the DEM measures is significantly positive for all leverage 
proxies, except for LDEBTBV. The economic impact of demand uncertainty is substantial. 
For example, a one standard deviation increase in DEM1 is associated with a 10.2% 
increase in the average TDEBTMV of Bertrand firms. 
Showalter (1995, 1999) contends that cost uncertainty is negatively associated with 
debt within Bertrand competition. However, the regressions for Bertrand firms indicate that 
none of the cost uncertainty proxies has a statistically significant effect on leverage. 
Coefficients are also not consistently negative across the panel models and they are 
generally very close to zero. We find no support for hypothesis H2. 
 With regard to the control variables in our Bertrand sample regressions, TANG, 
SIZE, PROFIT, MTB, and LIQUID show significant coefficients with the correct signs as 
predicted in the capital structure literature. The effect of the other variables is not 
significant, although they have the expected sign in most cases.  
 In the Cournot sample, the results show a positive and statistically significant effect 
of both demand and cost uncertainty on leverage in all 12 regression models (see Panel B). 
Hence, we find evidence that both demand uncertainty and cost uncertainty encourage 
Cournot firms to use strategic debt, consistent with hypotheses H3 and H4. These results 
are in line with the argument of Brander and Lewis (1986) that in the presence of output 
market uncertainty, firms have an incentive to have a high leverage to commit to aggressive 
competition. This aggressiveness induces their rival firms to reduce output, and raises the 
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expected profit of the leveraged firms. These effects are also significant from an economic 
point of view. A one standard deviation increase in DEM1 (COST1) is associated with a 
14.3% (13.3%) increase in the average TDEBTMV of Cournot firms. The coefficients on 
the control variables in the regressions based on the Cournot sample are in line with the 
capital structure literature. 
 To investigate whether the coefficients of the demand and cost uncertainty measures 
and the control variables differ significantly across the Bertrand and Cournot samples, we 
run regressions with the same specification as in Table 4, but based on all observations in 
the two samples together and including interaction terms of all variables with SSDUM.9 The 
results indicate that the coefficients of the cost uncertainty measures are significantly larger 
for Cournot firms than for Bertrand firms. Demand uncertainty does not significantly differ 
in terms of its impact on leverage across these two types of firms. The results are consistent 
with our main finding that demand uncertainty affects the leverage of all firms, but cost 
uncertainty is important for Cournot firms and not for Bertrand firms.  
 As a robustness check, we run all regressions in Table 4 with the absolute value of 
industry-average CSM as an additional explanatory variable. Lyandres (2006) suggests that 
there is a significantly positive relation between leverage and the extent of competitive 
interactions in the industry, regardless of the type of competitive behavior. The inclusion of 
the absolute value of industry-average CSM does not change our results. The demand and 
cost uncertainty proxies yield results that are consistent with Table 4: both DEM and COST 
measures have a significantly positive impact on the debt ratios of Cournot firms, while 
only demand uncertainty affects the leverage of Bertrand firms positively. The effect of the 
absolute value of industry-average CSM is statistically negligible in most of our regressions 
                                                 
9
 The results are not reported in the paper, but are available from the authors on request. 
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after controlling for demand and cost uncertainty. The exceptions are the three regressions 
with TDEBT as the dependent variable in the Cournot sample, in which the absolute value 
of CSM is positively associated with the debt ratio, consistent with Lyandres (2006). 
In short, our results indicate that the competitive behavior of firms affects the link 
between output market uncertainty and a firm’s capital structure choice. 
  
5. Conclusions 
This study contributes to the limited empirical literature on the relation between a firm’s 
capital structure decisions and its behavior in the product market. We investigate whether 
the type of competitive behavior (i.e., strategic complements or substitutes) plays a role in 
determining the impact of demand and cost uncertainty on leverage. While theoretical 
models of strategic debt explicitly distinguish between Cournot and Bertrand competition, 
empirical studies neglect this distinction in their analysis of the relation between 
competition and leverage.  
By estimating a measure for competitive strategy developed by previous studies, we 
categorize firms into two samples: a sample with firms competing in Bertrand (strategic 
complements) and a sample with firms competing in Cournot (strategic substitutes). We 
find that the samples of Bertrand and Cournot firms differ systematically in terms of firm 
characteristics. The industries included in the Bertrand and Cournot samples show a 
different association between demand and cost uncertainty and average debt ratios. 
We estimate a conventional capital structure regression for each of the two samples 
and include proxies of demand and cost uncertainty to investigate the strategic use of debt 
in different competitive environments. We show that for firms that engage in Cournot 
competition, both demand and cost uncertainty are positively associated with leverage, 
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consistent with Brander and Lewis (1986). This result supports the argument that under 
limited liability, Cournot firms facing output market uncertainty use debt to commit to a 
large output in an attempt to gain a strategic advantage in the product market. For firms that 
are characterized by Bertrand competition, cost uncertainty does not significantly affect 
leverage, but demand uncertainty induces a higher debt ratio. This latter finding is in line 
with the prediction of Showalter (1995) that higher demand uncertainty is associated with 
higher debt in Bertrand firms. 
 Overall, we show that the strategic aspects of capital structure choice are important 
and that the type of competition matters for the role of output market uncertainty in the link 
between financing and output decisions. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for all variables used in this study and compares the means across the Bertrand and Cournot samples. the variable 
definitions are as follows. LDEBTBV: book value of long-term debt ratio, defined as average total long-term debt divided by average total assets. 
TDEBTBV: book value of total debt ratio, defined as average total debt divided by average total assets. LDEBTMV: market value of long-term debt ratio, 
defined as the average total long-term debt divided by the average market value of total assets (which is calculated as total debt plus market value of 
equity plus preferred stock minus deferred taxes and investment credits). TDEBTMV: market value of total debt ratio, defined as the average total debt 
divided by the average market value of total assets. TANG: tangibility, defined as the ratio of average net fixed assets to average total assets. SIZE: firm 
size, defined as the natural log of average total assets. RISK: firm business risk, defined as the standard deviation of the ratio between operating income 
before depreciation to total assets. NDTS: non-debt tax shields, defined as the ratio of average depreciation and investment tax credit to average total 
assets. PROFIT: profitability, defined as the average operating income before depreciation divided by average total assets. MTB: market-to-book ratio, 
defined as the average market value of total assets over average total assets. LIQUID: liquidity, defined as the ratio of average cash and short-term 
investments to average total assets. DEM1, DEM2, and DEM3: demand uncertainty proxies, defined as the natural log of the standard error (scaled by 
sales) of trend regressions (1), (2), and (3) with sales as the dependent variable. COST1, COST2, and COST3: cost uncertainty proxies, defined as the 
natural log of the standard error of trend regressions (1), (2), and (3) with costs of goods sold over sales as the dependent variable. 
 
 
Bertrand sample 
# obs. = 954  
Cournot sample 
# obs. = 633  
Mean comparison 
(Cournot – Bertrand) 
 Mean Stdev Min Max  Mean Stdev Min Max  difference p-value 
LDEBTBV 0.156 0.174 0.000 1.145  0.136 0.157 0.000 1.710  -0.020 0.021 
TDEBTBV 0.208 0.221 0.000 1.915  0.183 0.183 0.000 1.778  -0.025 0.018 
LDEBTMV 0.121 0.159 0.000 0.885  0.138 0.177 0.000 0.837  0.017 0.046 
TDEBTMV 0.159 0.193 0.000 1.097  0.180 0.210 0.000 1.033  0.021 0.037 
TANG 0.245 0.193 0.000 0.874  0.208 0.161 0.011 0.750  -0.037 0.000 
SIZE 5.257 2.285 0.062 12.001  4.874 2.169 0.078 10.433  -0.383 0.001 
RISK 0.102 0.150 0.003 2.445  0.087 0.112 0.004 1.010  -0.015 0.037 
NDTS 0.046 0.028 0.000 0.313  0.048 0.030 0.005 0.365  0.002 0.194 
PROFIT 0.003 0.250 -2.453 0.497  0.038 0.203 -1.129 0.417  0.035 0.004 
MTB 2.486 2.213 0.230 25.333  1.914 1.835 0.156 24.779  -0.572 0.000 
LIQUID 0.293 0.276 0.000 0.953  0.196 0.190 0.000 0.858  -0.097 0.000 
DEM1 -3.149 1.011 -6.125 1.574  -3.399 0.858 -5.634 0.018  -0.250 0.000 
DEM2 -3.367 1.074 -6.096 1.333  -3.655 0.921 -6.274 -0.020  -0.288 0.000 
DEM3 -3.464 1.091 -6.073 1.358  -3.753 0.929 -6.258 -0.016  -0.289 0.000 
COST1 -1.944 2.389 -5.259 6.786  -2.786 1.333 -5.024 4.903  -0.842 0.000 
COST2 -2.031 2.401 -5.409 6.781  -2.888 1.363 -5.189 4.797  -0.857 0.000 
COST3 -2.092 2.408 -5.378 6.824  -2.954 1.372 -5.393 4.824  -0.862 0.000 
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Table 2: Correlations 
 
This table presents the correlations between all variables used in this study. Variable definitions are discussed in Table 1. 
 
Panel A: Bertrand sample (# obs. = 954)           
 LDEBTBV TDEBTBV LDEBTMV TDEBTMV TANG SIZE RISK NDTS PROFIT MTB LIQUID DEM1 DEM2 DEM3 COST1 COST2 COST3 
LDEBTBV 1.000                 
TDEBTBV 0.841 1.000                
LDEBTMV 0.758 0.632 1.000               
TDEBTMV 0.674 0.738 0.925 1.000              
TANG 0.297 0.292 0.432 0.419 1.000             
SIZE 0.188 0.071 0.227 0.146 0.349 1.000            
RISK -0.080 -0.019 -0.225 -0.201 -0.251 -0.381 1.000           
NDTS 0.130 0.187 0.174 0.204 0.380 0.075 0.036 1.000          
PROFIT 0.063 0.027 0.216 0.203 0.320 0.442 -0.629 -0.046 1.000         
MTB -0.134 -0.148 -0.411 -0.438 -0.292 -0.192 0.332 -0.122 -0.361 1.000        
LIQUID -0.293 -0.362 -0.480 -0.531 -0.590 -0.296 0.383 -0.327 -0.576 0.437 1.000       
DEM1 -0.109 -0.090 -0.211 -0.204 -0.302 -0.321 0.419 -0.026 -0.607 0.212 0.581 1.000      
DEM2 -0.108 -0.092 -0.205 -0.198 -0.278 -0.324 0.395 -0.038 -0.610 0.191 0.569 0.965 1.000     
DEM3 -0.113 -0.097 -0.207 -0.202 -0.284 -0.325 0.389 -0.035 -0.610 0.198 0.569 0.954 0.986 1.000    
COST1 -0.098 -0.102 -0.263 -0.271 -0.328 -0.345 0.491 -0.119 -0.742 0.328 0.661 0.694 0.692 0.692 1.000   
COST2 -0.097 -0.100 -0.259 -0.265 -0.323 -0.347 0.487 -0.116 -0.740 0.322 0.655 0.695 0.695 0.695 0.998 1.000  
COST3 -0.094 -0.096 -0.256 -0.261 -0.321 -0.347 0.485 -0.116 -0.739 0.320 0.650 0.695 0.696 0.697 0.996 0.999 1.000 
                  
Panel B: Cournot sample (# obs. = 633)           
 
LDEBTBV TDEBTBV LDEBTMV TDEBTMV TANG SIZE RISK NDTS PROFIT MTB LIQUID DEM1 DEM2 DEM3 COST1 COST2 COST3 
LDEBTBV 1.000                 
TDEBTBV 0.911 1.000                
LDEBTMV 0.812 0.736 1.000               
TDEBTMV 0.745 0.788 0.946 1.000              
TANG 0.356 0.295 0.505 0.450 1.000             
SIZE 0.334 0.203 0.409 0.317 0.454 1.000            
RISK -0.216 -0.111 -0.252 -0.217 -0.275 -0.460 1.000           
NDTS -0.033 0.010 -0.047 -0.031 0.171 -0.102 0.186 1.000          
PROFIT 0.192 0.088 0.193 0.157 0.310 0.460 -0.713 -0.276 1.000         
MTB -0.233 -0.230 -0.393 -0.420 -0.255 -0.225 0.319 0.033 -0.252 1.000        
LIQUID -0.460 -0.498 -0.519 -0.558 -0.492 -0.358 0.345 -0.116 -0.398 0.417 1.000       
DEM1 -0.083 0.012 -0.088 -0.021 -0.271 -0.450 0.497 0.123 -0.552 0.086 0.279 1.000      
DEM2 -0.099 0.010 -0.104 -0.028 -0.300 -0.480 0.481 0.113 -0.555 0.062 0.272 0.942 1.000     
DEM3 -0.103 0.001 -0.113 -0.040 -0.308 -0.490 0.486 0.120 -0.557 0.065 0.272 0.923 0.983 1.000    
COST1 -0.132 -0.064 -0.151 -0.116 -0.243 -0.406 0.562 0.117 -0.607 0.226 0.436 0.592 0.582 0.580 1.000   
COST2 -0.130 -0.059 -0.146 -0.109 -0.252 -0.417 0.557 0.113 -0.600 0.226 0.422 0.587 0.586 0.587 0.992 1.000  
COST3 -0.126 -0.053 -0.143 -0.104 -0.249 -0.418 0.549 0.118 -0.596 0.227 0.409 0.583 0.583 0.586 0.986 0.996 1.000 
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Table 3: Industry averages and ranks 
 
This table presents the industry averages and ranks of four measures of leverage and three measures of both demand and cost uncertainty in the Bertrand 
and Cournot samples. Variable definitions are discussed in Table 1. The 4-digit SIC industry descriptions are taken from Compustat documentation. 
 
Panel A: Bertrand sample (# obs. = 954) 
                 
SIC Industry description Obs. LDEBTBV/rank TDEBTBV/rank LDEBTMV/rank TDEBTMV/rank DEM1/rank DEM2/rank DEM3/rank COST1/rank COST2/rank COST3/rank 
3081 Unsupp plastics film & sheet 17 0.368 1 0.441 2 0.379 3 0.446 4 -3.715 15 -3.902 12 -3.993 12 -2.711 7 -2.727 7 -2.768 6 
3086 Plastics foam products 8 0.365 2 0.498 1 0.387 2 0.544 1 -3.922 22 -4.050 18 -4.073 15 -3.107 11 -3.277 13 -3.316 12 
2084 Wine, brandy & brandy spirits 10 0.349 3 0.407 3 0.356 4 0.417 5 -3.910 21 -4.059 19 -4.130 20 -3.431 19 -3.481 17 -3.544 18 
2421 Sawmills, planing mills, gen 7 0.345 4 0.390 4 0.307 6 0.352 6 -3.639 12 -3.918 14 -4.017 14 -3.388 17 -3.558 20 -3.584 20 
3532 Mng machy, eq, ex oil field 2 0.315 5 0.338 7 0.212 12 0.231 13 -3.699 13 -4.124 22 -4.173 21 -3.335 15 -3.386 15 -3.356 14 
2211 Broadwoven fabric mill, cotton 16 0.312 6 0.377 5 0.404 1 0.491 3 -3.803 19 -4.013 15 -4.115 18 -3.384 16 -3.426 16 -3.511 17 
3444 Sheet metal work 5 0.277 7 0.376 6 0.344 5 0.511 2 -2.909 3 -3.356 5 -3.469 5 -2.775 8 -2.831 8 -2.847 8 
3531 Construction machinery & eq 18 0.222 8 0.279 10 0.218 11 0.272 11 -3.422 8 -3.843 11 -4.015 13 -3.643 23 -3.741 23 -3.780 23 
2911 Petroleum refining 74 0.219 9 0.262 13 0.268 7 0.311 8 -3.439 9 -3.574 8 -3.685 6 -3.154 13 -3.218 11 -3.252 11 
2821 Plastics, resins, elastomers 19 0.217 10 0.263 12 0.246 10 0.296 9 -3.741 16 -4.020 16 -4.114 17 -3.558 21 -3.690 22 -3.765 22 
2052 Cookies & crackers 4 0.213 11 0.226 16 0.255 9 0.271 12 -3.881 20 -4.045 17 -4.128 19 -3.712 24 -3.843 24 -4.059 24 
3317 Steel pipe and tubes 13 0.205 12 0.256 14 0.262 8 0.330 7 -3.291 6 -3.556 6 -3.741 8 -3.068 10 -3.232 12 -3.346 13 
3585 Air-cond, heating, refrig eq 27 0.204 13 0.286 8 0.197 13 0.280 10 -3.929 23 -4.231 23 -4.377 24 -3.474 20 -3.521 19 -3.557 19 
2673 Plastic, foil, coated paper bags 2 0.182 14 0.263 11 0.172 15 0.221 15 -3.700 14 -4.321 24 -4.286 23 -2.500 5 -2.533 5 -2.594 4 
2082 Malt beverages 14 0.156 15 0.184 20 0.104 17 0.124 19 -3.968 24 -4.104 21 -4.258 22 -3.574 22 -3.685 21 -3.759 21 
2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 275 0.153 16 0.204 18 0.068 22 0.092 21 -3.059 4 -3.268 3 -3.365 3 -1.239 2 -1.343 2 -1.405 2 
3812 Srch, det, nav, guid, aero sys 43 0.152 17 0.198 19 0.175 14 0.221 16 -3.548 11 -3.792 10 -3.899 10 -3.119 12 -3.194 10 -3.241 10 
3634 Electric housewares & fans 13 0.145 18 0.215 17 0.152 16 0.222 14 -3.766 17 -3.911 13 -3.932 11 -3.324 14 -3.372 14 -3.477 15 
2836 Biological pds, ex diagnostics 116 0.133 19 0.153 22 0.046 24 0.053 24 -2.311 1 -2.486 1 -2.543 1 1.070 1 1.002 1 0.949 1 
2024 Ice cream & frozen desserts 13 0.124 20 0.169 21 0.088 18 0.113 20 -3.784 18 -4.060 20 -4.103 16 -3.399 18 -3.490 18 -3.487 16 
3674 Semiconductor, related service 93 0.108 21 0.131 23 0.069 21 0.087 23 -2.804 2 -3.064 2 -3.157 2 -2.400 3 -2.487 3 -2.584 3 
3651 household audio & video eq 31 0.092 22 0.234 15 0.085 19 0.198 17 -3.378 7 -3.583 9 -3.789 9 -2.603 6 -2.721 6 -2.793 7 
3821 Lab apparatus & furniture 20 0.081 23 0.280 9 0.073 20 0.175 18 -3.503 10 -3.571 7 -3.690 7 -3.005 9 -3.037 9 -3.072 9 
3661 Tele & telegraph apparatus 114 0.077 24 0.127 24 0.056 23 0.090 22 -3.086 5 -3.350 4 -3.431 4 -2.443 4 -2.533 4 -2.597 5 
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Table 3, continued 
 
Panel B: Cournot sample (# obs. = 633) 
                 
SIC Industry description Obs. LDEBTBV/rank TDEBTBV/rank LDEBTMV/rank TDEBTMV/rank DEM1/rank DEM2/rank DEM3/rank COST1/rank COST2/rank COST3/rank 
2631 Paperboard mills 13 0.381 1 0.428 1 0.469 2 0.548 1 -3.806 16 -4.020 16 -4.081 14 -2.781 6 -2.865 6 -2.922 7 
3743 Railroad equipment 6 0.325 2 0.389 2 0.315 4 0.390 4 -3.315 10 -3.686 11 -3.800 12 -3.541 16 -3.593 16 -3.664 16 
3334 Prim production of aluminum 8 0.292 3 0.316 3 0.486 1 0.523 2 -4.116 17 -4.429 17 -4.558 17 -3.727 18 -3.973 18 -4.048 18 
3357 Drawing, insulating nonfer wire 6 0.243 4 0.284 5 0.268 5 0.312 6 -2.792 1 -3.000 1 -3.322 4 -2.782 7 -2.881 7 -2.893 6 
3312 Steel works & blast furnaces 66 0.235 5 0.272 6 0.353 3 0.411 3 -3.502 13 -3.894 13 -4.023 13 -3.146 13 -3.280 13 -3.347 13 
2711 Newspaper: pubg, pubg & print 48 0.228 6 0.253 9 0.184 8 0.204 11 -4.248 19 -4.600 21 -4.656 20 -3.564 17 -3.670 17 -3.743 17 
2851 Paints, varnishes, lacquers 19 0.202 7 0.240 11 0.160 11 0.189 13 -4.234 18 -4.560 19 -4.579 19 -3.910 20 -4.028 19 -4.111 19 
2085 Distilled & blended liquor 2 0.192 8 0.269 7 0.134 12 0.193 12 -4.400 21 -4.545 18 -4.562 18 -4.498 21 -4.465 21 -4.433 21 
3652 Phono recrds, audio tape, disk 6 0.180 9 0.252 10 0.166 10 0.224 9 -3.337 11 -3.694 12 -3.744 11 -3.027 11 -3.059 10 -3.129 9 
3724 Aircraft engine, engine parts 19 0.178 10 0.225 12 0.244 6 0.303 7 -3.714 14 -3.964 14 -4.189 16 -3.052 12 -3.096 11 -3.169 11 
3949 Sporting & athletic goods, nec 24 0.163 11 0.300 4 0.195 7 0.315 5 -3.050 6 -3.271 6 -3.400 6 -2.659 5 -2.726 5 -2.741 5 
3442 Metal doors, frames, mold, trim 6 0.155 12 0.177 14 0.131 13 0.152 14 -4.346 20 -4.599 20 -4.726 21 -3.795 19 -4.098 20 -4.168 20 
3942 Dolls & stuffed toys 10 0.152 13 0.255 8 0.120 14 0.215 10 -3.292 9 -3.503 9 -3.645 9 -3.333 15 -3.410 15 -3.478 15 
3555 Printing trades machy, equip 15 0.123 14 0.209 13 0.167 9 0.296 8 -2.977 3 -3.169 3 -3.202 1 -3.010 10 -3.098 12 -3.169 10 
3577 Computer peripheral eq, nec 62 0.093 15 0.138 15 0.066 18 0.096 19 -3.179 7 -3.455 8 -3.513 7 -2.464 4 -2.560 3 -2.641 3 
3826 Lab analytical instruments 37 0.089 16 0.130 18 0.053 20 0.079 20 -3.774 15 -3.995 15 -4.129 15 -2.792 8 -2.885 8 -2.959 8 
3663 Radio, TV broadcast, comm eq 117 0.082 17 0.130 17 0.066 19 0.102 18 -3.017 5 -3.209 5 -3.323 5 -2.456 2 -2.553 2 -2.612 2 
3845 Electromedical apparatus 110 0.081 18 0.115 20 0.045 21 0.066 21 -3.213 8 -3.443 7 -3.522 8 -2.071 1 -2.157 1 -2.234 1 
3823 Industrial measurement instr 51 0.080 19 0.124 19 0.082 17 0.123 17 -3.409 12 -3.618 10 -3.699 10 -3.202 14 -3.343 14 -3.381 14 
2741 Miscellaneous publishing 4 0.075 20 0.096 21 0.112 15 0.133 16 -3.010 4 -3.150 2 -3.298 3 -2.461 3 -2.596 4 -2.644 4 
3695 Magnetic, optic recordng media 4 0.074 21 0.138 16 0.083 16 0.150 15 -2.959 2 -3.179 4 -3.242 2 -2.925 9 -3.054 9 -3.225 12 
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Table 4: Capital structure regressions with demand and cost uncertainty 
 
This table presents the results of 12 panel data regressions of leverage on conventional capital structure determinants and measures of demand and cost 
uncertainty. Data are from three consecutive periods: 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004. All models include firm random effects. Variable 
definitions are discussed in Table 1. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. White standard errors are used to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Panel A: Bertrand sample 
 LDEBTBV  TDEBTBV  LDEBTMV  TDEBTMV 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
TANG 0.091* 0.090* 0.091*  0.124* 0.122* 0.124*  0.042 0.041 0.042  0.046 0.045 0.047 
 (0.072) (0.075) (0.073)  (0.070) (0.074) (0.071)  (0.315) (0.323) (0.314)  (0.329) (0.341) (0.327) 
SIZE 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015***  0.008** 0.008** 0.008**  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***  0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.018) (0.019) (0.021)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.373) (0.387) (0.395) 
RISK -0.003 0.001 0.001  0.053 0.060 0.061  -0.050 -0.047 -0.047  -0.048 -0.044 -0.043 
 (0.952) (0.988) (0.979)  (0.234) (0.195) (0.189)  (0.129) (0.139) (0.14)  (0.136) (0.163) (0.164) 
NDTS -0.037 -0.020 -0.019  0.004 0.035 0.036  -0.076 -0.058 -0.060  -0.116 -0.092 -0.093 
 (0.873) (0.931) (0.936)  (0.992) (0.915) (0.915)  (0.659) (0.735) (0.728)  (0.653) (0.723) (0.718) 
PROFIT -0.139*** -0.139*** -0.139***  -0.202*** -0.201*** -0.200***  -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.112***  -0.150*** -0.149*** -0.148*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTB -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003  -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***  -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.465) (0.463) (0.444)  (0.261) (0.266) (0.245)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQUID -0.189*** -0.185*** -0.183***  -0.384*** -0.378*** -0.376***  -0.168*** -0.164*** -0.163***  -0.289*** -0.284*** -0.284*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEM1 0.012    0.023**    0.011**    0.016***   
 (0.115)    (0.015)    (0.034)    (0.007)   
COST1 -0.001    -0.001    -0.002    -0.002   
 (0.875)    (0.852)    (0.323)    (0.492)   
DEM2  0.009    0.018**    0.006    0.011**  
  (0.197)    (0.037)    (0.183)    (0.045)  
COST2  0.000    0.000    -0.002    -0.001  
  (0.922)    (0.981)    (0.501)    (0.738)  
DEM3   0.007    0.015*    0.006    0.010*** 
   (0.319)    (0.088)    (0.187)    (0.070) 
COST3   0.000    0.001    -0.002    -0.001 
   (0.927)    (0.848)    (0.532)    (0.828) 
No. (2-digit SIC)                
industry dummies 12 12 12  12 12 12  12 12 12  12 12 12 
Obs 954 954 954  954 954 954  954 954 954  954 954 954 
Between R2 0.472 0.473 0.457  0.985 0.987 0.983  0.996 0.997 0.997  0.998 0.998 0.998 
Overall R2 0.208 0.207 0.206  0.234 0.233 0.232  0.425 0.424 0.424  0.458 0.456 0.456 
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Table 4, continued 
 
Panel B: Cournot sample 
 LDEBTBV  TDEBTBV  LDEBTMV  TDEBTMV 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
TANG 0.038 0.039 0.040  0.054 0.058 0.057  0.093 0.094* 0.095*  0.083 0.086 0.086 
 (0.474) (0.454) (0.451)  (0.318) (0.284) (0.291)  (0.104) (0.097) (0.095)  (0.191) (0.173) (0.174) 
SIZE 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***  0.004 0.005 0.005  0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013***  0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.314) (0.249) (0.254)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.079) (0.060) (0.063) 
RISK -0.134*** -0.122*** -0.121***  -0.098 -0.086 -0.083  -0.163*** -0.157*** -0.154***  -0.205*** -0.196*** -0.192*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.227) (0.279) (0.294)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
NDTS -0.384** -0.373** -0.380**  -0.550*** -0.535** -0.546***  -0.540*** -0.529*** -0.536***  -0.705*** -0.689*** -0.699*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)  (0.008) (0.011) (0.010)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
PROFIT -0.018 -0.020 -0.021  -0.101 -0.100 -0.104  -0.096** -0.095** -0.096***  -0.134*** -0.131*** -0.134*** 
 (0.706) (0.691) (0.669)  (0.13) (0.14) (0.127)  (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
MTB 0.001 0.002 0.002  0.001 0.002 0.001  -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012***  -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (0.601) (0.567) (0.583)  (0.709) (0.649) (0.695)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
LIQUID -0.305*** -0.299*** -0.297***  -0.493*** -0.485*** -0.483***  -0.298*** -0.294*** -0.292***  -0.469*** -0.464*** -0.461*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DEM1 0.029***    0.031**    0.022**    0.030***   
 (0.005)    (0.011)    (0.015)    (0.004)   
COST1 0.012**    0.016**    0.012**    0.018***   
 (0.037)    (0.020)    (0.012)    (0.002)   
DEM2  0.024**    0.029**    0.018**    0.027***  
  (0.020)    (0.016)    (0.035)    (0.010)  
COST2  0.012**    0.015**    0.013***    0.018***  
  (0.030)    (0.022)    (0.007)    (0.001)  
DEM3   0.023**    0.026**    0.018**    0.025** 
   (0.028)    (0.035)    (0.036)    (0.015) 
COST3   0.012**    0.015**    0.013***    0.018*** 
   (0.030)    (0.017)    (0.009)    (0.002) 
No. (2-digit SIC)                
industry dummies 11 11 11  11 11 11  11 11 11  11 11 11 
Obs 633 633 633  633 633 633  633 633 633  633 633 633 
Between R2 0.997 0.991 0.989  1.000 0.999 0.999  0.992 0.995 0.996  0.989 0.995 0.996 
Overall R2 0.327 0.324 0.324  0.339 0.338 0.336  0.528 0.528 0.527  0.528 0.528 0.526 
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Table 5: Capital structure regressions with demand and cost uncertainty – robustness check 
 
This table presents the results of 12 panel data regressions of leverage on conventional capital structure determinants, measures of demand and cost 
uncertainty, and Abs. value CSM, the absolute value of the industry-average competitive strategy measure. Data are from three consecutive periods: 1990-
1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004. Other variable definitions are discussed in Table 1. All models include firm random effects. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. White standard errors are used to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
 
Panel A: Bertrand sample 
 LDEBTBV  TDEBTBV  LDEBTMV  TDEBTMV 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
TANG 0.091* 0.091* 0.092*  0.123* 0.122* 0.124*  0.042 0.041 0.042  0.046 0.045 0.046 
 (0.072) (0.074) (0.072)  (0.071) (0.075) (0.072)  (0.314) (0.322) (0.313)  (0.331) (0.344) (0.33) 
SIZE 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***  0.008** 0.008** 0.008**  0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***  0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.352) (0.365) (0.373) 
RISK -0.002 0.001 0.001  0.053 0.059 0.061  -0.050 -0.047 -0.047  -0.049 -0.044 -0.043 
 (0.957) (0.987) (0.979)  (0.237) (0.196) (0.189)  (0.131) (0.141) (0.142)  (0.127) (0.158) (0.159) 
NDTS -0.054 -0.039 -0.038  0.043 0.074 0.074  -0.085 -0.069 -0.070  -0.088 -0.063 -0.065 
 (0.818) (0.868) (0.872)  (0.899) (0.827) (0.827)  (0.619) (0.689) (0.682)  (0.733) (0.807) (0.802) 
PROFIT -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.141***  -0.198*** -0.197*** -0.196***  -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.114***  -0.147*** -0.145*** -0.145*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTB -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003  -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015***  -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.020*** 
 (0.442) (0.436) (0.417)  (0.315) (0.323) (0.299)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LIQUID -0.191*** -0.187*** -0.185***  -0.379*** -0.374*** -0.372***  -0.168*** -0.165*** -0.164***  -0.285*** -0.282*** -0.281*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Abs. value CSM -0.202 -0.216 -0.217  0.465 0.440 0.439  -0.104 -0.117 -0.117  0.341 0.324 0.324 
 (0.316) (0.282) (0.279)  (0.246) (0.273) (0.275)  (0.640) (0.600) (0.602)  (0.227) (0.253) (0.253) 
DEM1 0.012    0.024**    0.010**    0.017***   
 (0.120)    (0.012)    (0.038)    (0.005)   
COST1 -0.001    -0.001    -0.003    -0.002   
 (0.861)    (0.881)    (0.315)    (0.517)   
DEM2  0.009    0.018**    0.006    0.011**  
  (0.211)    (0.034)    (0.193)    (0.038)  
COST2  0.000    0.000    -0.002    -0.001  
  (0.9)    (0.981)    (0.488)    (0.778)  
DEM3   0.007    0.015*    0.006    0.010* 
   (0.338)    (0.081)    (0.197)    (0.059) 
COST3   0.000    0.001    -0.002    0.000 
   (0.947)    (0.815)    (0.519)    (0.867) 
No. (2-digit SIC)                
industry dummies 12 12 12  12 12 12  12 12 12  12 12 12 
Obs 954 954 954  954 954 954  954 954 954  954 954 954 
Between R2 0.485 0.469 0.453  0.986 0.988 0.984  0.996 0.997 0.997  0.998 0.997 0.998 
Overall R2 0.209 0.207 0.207  0.237 0.234 0.233  0.426 0.424 0.424  0.459 0.457 0.457 
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Table 5, continued 
 
Panel B: Cournot sample 
 LDEBTBV  TDEBTBV  LDEBTMV  TDEBTMV 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
TANG 0.036 0.037 0.038  0.051 0.055 0.054  0.092 0.093 0.094  0.081 0.084 0.084 
 (0.497) (0.477) (0.473)  (0.348) (0.312) (0.318)  (0.111) (0.104) (0.101)  (0.204) (0.186) (0.186) 
SIZE 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***  0.004 0.005 0.005  0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***  0.007* 0.007* 0.007* 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.324) (0.26) (0.264)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.082) (0.062) (0.065) 
RISK -0.127*** -0.116*** -0.114**  -0.087 -0.075 -0.072  -0.158*** -0.152*** -0.149***  -0.197*** -0.189*** -0.184*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.290) (0.348) (0.369)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
NDTS -0.438*** -0.427*** -0.435***  -0.641*** -0.624*** -0.638***  -0.579*** -0.568*** -0.575***  -0.763*** -0.746*** -0.759*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
PROFIT -0.022 -0.024 -0.025  -0.107 -0.106 -0.110  -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.099***  -0.138*** -0.135*** -0.139*** 
 (0.649) (0.633) (0.613)  (0.107) (0.115) (0.104)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
MTB 0.002 0.002 0.002  0.001 0.002 0.002  -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011***  -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (0.568) (0.542) (0.556)  (0.664) (0.616) (0.66)  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
LIQUID -0.311*** -0.305*** -0.303***  -0.503*** -0.495*** -0.493***  -0.302*** -0.299*** -0.296***  -0.476*** -0.470*** -0.467*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Abs. value CSM 0.581 0.578 0.593  0.972* 0.954* 0.981**  0.412 0.410 0.420  0.623 0.613 0.634 
 (0.172) (0.177) (0.164)  (0.052) (0.058) (0.049)  (0.419) (0.419) (0.407)  (0.304) (0.309) (0.291) 
DEM1 0.028***    0.029**    0.021**    0.029***   
 (0.007)    (0.016)    (0.018)    (0.006)   
COST1 0.013**    0.017**    0.013**    0.018***   
 (0.030)    (0.015)    (0.011)    (0.002)   
DEM2  0.023**    0.027**    0.018**    0.026**  
  (0.026)    (0.023)    (0.041)    (0.012)  
COST2  0.013**    0.016**    0.013***    0.019***  
  (0.024)    (0.016)    (0.007)    (0.001)  
DEM3   0.022**    0.024**    0.018**    0.024** 
   (0.035)    (0.047)    (0.042)    (0.019) 
COST3   0.012**    0.016**    0.013***    0.018*** 
   (0.024)    (0.013)    (0.009)    (0.002) 
No. (2-digit SIC)                
industry dummies 11 11 11  11 11 11  11 11 11  11 11 11 
Obs 633 633 633  633 633 633  633 633 633  633 633 633 
Between R2 0.999 0.995 0.994  0.997 0.998 0.999  0.989 0.993 0.995  0.986 0.992 0.993 
Overall R2 0.329 0.326 0.326  0.343 0.342 0.340  0.529 0.528 0.528  0.529 0.529 0.528 
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